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SUMMARY 
The idea of personal autonomy is central to many accounts of eudaimonic 
well-being. Yet it is often criticised as a Western concept celebrating 
individualism and independence over group obligations and 
interdependence or dependence. This paper rejects this view and argues 
that coherent accounts of autonomy must always recognize the 
interdependence of people in groups, and that autonomy can coexist with 
substantial relationships of dependence. It illustrates this drawing on 
evidence from Bangladesh, a poor country usually absent from cross-
cultural studies and one where personal relationships of hierarchy and 
dependence are endemic. Argument and evidence is presented showing the 
coexistence of personal autonomy and dependence, and the relationship 
between collective action and autonomy. We also address some of the 
specific problems encountered in researching autonomy in a social context 
where it is mainly expressed in relational forms. We conclude that autonomy 
can be directed toward both personal and social goals, and can be enacted 
individually, or by participation in groups. Autonomy is a universal 
psychological need but its expression is always contextual. 
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The notion of autonomy features in many philosophical conceptions of well-
being, though it goes under different names. Finnis (1980) includes 
‘practical reason’ or ‘authentic self-direction’ as a basic human value; for 
Griffin (1996) ‘agency’ is a core prudential value; for Nussbaum (2000) 
‘practical reason’ is a central human functioning capability; for Sen (2002) 
‘process freedom’ is of equal importance to outcomes in evaluating well-
being; for Doyal and Gough (1991) ‘autonomy’ is a basic human need, a 
universal precondition for any individual action in any culture.1  
 
Autonomy is also central to those psychologists exploring eudaimonic 
conceptions of well-being, the subject of this Special Issue. Ryff (1989), 
providing a ‘parsimonious summary’ of the stream of writers on 
psychological well-being, contends that the notion of positive well-being 
comprises six dimensions, including ‘autonomy’, and the related notions of 
‘environmental mastery’ and ‘self-actualization’. Ryan and Deci (2000, 2001) 
go further and firmly distinguish eudaimonic well-being from hedonic well-
being, the former comprising notions of meaningfulness and self-realization. 
Three universal psychological needs are identified for such psychological 
growth and integrity, one of which is autonomy - the evolved propensity to 
self-regulate one’s actions, a propensity that is experientially associated 
with feeling integrated and acting with intention. One crucial feature of the 
distinction between eudaimonic and hedonic well-being is that ‘from the 
eudaimonic perspective, subjective happiness cannot be equated with well-
being’ (Ryan and Deci, 2001, p.146).  This parallels the arguments in Doyal 
and Gough and other writers on autonomy: to say that autonomy is a basic 
need, or a basic human value, or a basic psychological need is to say that 
human well-being cannot be entirely captured by notions of happiness, life 
satisfaction, or subjective well-being. It implies that a person can be happy 
but experience low levels of autonomy, and conversely that a highly 
autonomous person can be anxious, troubled, dissatisfied, unhappy. In 
order to better understand this interaction, the nature of autonomy must be 
explored and clarified and, just as important, its extent operationalised and 
measured.  
One powerful challenge to its status comes from writers who argue that it is 
a Western concept with little applicability to the lives of people across much 
 
1
 Alkire (2002, chapter 2) supplies an exhaustive account and insightful interpretation of 
Finnis, Griffin, Sen, and other philosophical writers on wellbeing). 
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of the world. The fact that all of the above approaches derive from Western 
intellectual traditions underpins challenges that question its coherence and 
suitability as a concept for understanding well-being in developing countries. 
It is claimed inter alia that the notion fails to capture the cultural specificity of 
these settings and rests on an assumption about independent man (sic) that 
sits awkwardly with the reality of life in many societies (Christopher, 1999). 
In particular, more collectivist societies and cultures are claimed to value 
interdependence or even dependence and pursue group obligations rather 
than individual autonomy (Diener and Suh, 2000; Rozin, 1999; Uchida et al., 
2004). 
 
The purpose of this article is to address this issue and to set these 
arguments alongside evidence from Bangladesh, one of the poorest 
countries in the world2. It draws on research ideas and findings from the 
ESRC Research Group on Well-being in Developing Countries (WeD) at the 
University of Bath, and is the outcome of an ongoing debate within the 
group3. We draw mainly on primary data collected for the Quality of Life 
(QoL) component of the WeD research. This is supplemented with 
secondary data and analysis that have emerged from ongoing research into 
a collective action group in Bangladesh (Devine 2002, 2004). The QoL 
component entailed three distinct phases. In the first phase, the primary aim 
was to identify key categories and components of quality of life for different 
individuals in different locations. The second phase was conceptual in 
nature and sought to reflect on the findings of the first phase. In the third 
phase, a specific measure of QoL was developed by WeD researchers and 
applied in all the research sites4.  
 
During the first phase of the QoL work in Bangladesh, a variety of research 
tools were deployed including semi-structured interviews (n = 73), focus 
 
2
 The choice of a South Asian country like Bangladesh is interesting in its own right as the 
majority of comparative studies on autonomy are between the USA, and the supposedly 
collectivist societies of Japan, Hong Kong, China, or Korea (Oyserman et al 2002, Uchida et 
al 2004). 
3
 See www.welldev.org.uk for more details of the Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) 
research program. 
4
 WeD carries out research in four countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Peru and Thailand. While 
different countries adopted different methods in of exploring and defining quality of life (QoL), 
the QoL instrument developed from this data was administered in all the sites.  
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group discussion (n = 240), the Person Generated Index (n = 42) (Ruta et 
al, 2004), and a Global Happiness Question (n = 73). The research for 
phase one took place over a period of one year (January to December 
2004) and was developed in iteration with findings emerging from other 
aspects of the overall WeD research program5. The main criteria used to 
select respondents and participants for the QoL research were gender, age, 
rural and urban residence, religious affiliation, and economic differences. 
The data used specifically in this article relate to two broad areas of enquiry 
of the first phase:  
· An exploration of the goals, values, motivations, and future 
aspirations of young urban Bangladeshi women (Choudhury, 2006), 
supplemented by responses to the semi-structured interview 
schedule by a sample of urban Bangladeshi women aged 20 to 65.  
· People’s responses to interview and focus group questions about 
characteristics of households and individuals living well or living 
badly; individual experiences of happiness and unhappiness; 
individual hopes and fears; and finally, people’s views on what 
constitutes an ideal village or community (Camfield et al., 2006). 
 
The article proceeds in the following stages. First, the opposition between 
autonomy and interdependence is set out, focusing on theories of universal 
basic needs as well as critiques and alternative propositions derived mainly 
from literature on South Asia. The next three sections develop the counter-
argument, supported with evidence from prior studies and from our fieldwork 
in Bangladesh. Section two develops our central argument that the 
antinomy between autonomy and interdependence is a false one. Drawing 
on approaches to basic needs and psychological needs, and on arguments 
and evidence from South Asia, we develop the idea that autonomy can only 
be realised though interdependence, and show that people can value both 
autonomy and dependence. The third section argues that an 
environmentally contextual notion of autonomy requires, and is best 
 
5 
WeD research involves a number of survey type instruments as well as more process-
orientated work. During the initial phase of the QoL research, researchers were also 
consolidating community profiles for each of the research sites, administering a Resources 
and Needs Questionnaire, and collecting data through observation and other participatory 
techniques. One of the characteristics  of the WeD program is that the research components 
are not treated as stand-alone projects, but are considered interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing.   
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evaluated across, different domains of life. In the fourth section we consider 
the role of collective action in enhancing the autonomy of individuals. The 
final section concludes by confirming that autonomy is a universal goal, but 
is to be conceived and appraised as multiple situated autonomies. In poor, 
collectivist societies such as Bangladesh it is frequently expressed and 
achieved through significant horizontal and vertical relationships. The need 
is to move beyond the sterile autonomy-interdependence opposition to 
explore the choice of alternative goals and of intentional actions to achieve 
them within specific contexts. 
 
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Needs 
 
We begin with the analysis of autonomy presented by one of us in A Theory 
of Human Need (Doyal and Gough 1991, henceforth THN). At the most 
basic level, autonomy (deriving from the Greek ‘self’ + ‘rule’) refers to “the 
ability to make informed choices about what should be done and how to go 
about doing it. This entails being able to formulate aims and beliefs about 
how to achieve them, along with the ability to evaluate the success of those 
beliefs in the light of empirical evidence” (THN, p. 53). This minimal level of 
autonomy is labelled ‘autonomy of agency’. It begins to develop within 
children at an early age and is possessed to some degree by all humans.  
 
THN (p. 63) goes on to present a more detailed list of components. 
Generally speaking, the existence of even minimal levels of autonomy will 
entail the following: 
a) that actors have the intellectual capacity to formulate aims and 
beliefs common to their form of life;  
b) that actors have enough confidence to want to act and thus to 
participate in some form of social life; 
c) that actors actually do act by seeking to achieve their aims and 
beliefs ; 
d) that actors perceive their actions as having been done by them 
and not by someone else; 
e) that actors are able to understand the empirical constraints on the 
success of their actions; 
f) that actors are capable of taking responsibility for what they do. 
 
THN also argues that autonomy of agency will be impaired if three 
conditions pertain: firstly, if people lack sufficient understanding of their 
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culture and its expectations; secondly, if they lack the psychological 
capacity to formulate opinions, as in the case of severe mental illness; and 
thirdly, if their opportunities to participate in significant social activities are 
blocked. At this abstract level everyone, except those in long-term coma 
and with advanced degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s, possess 
some degree of autonomy. But differences of degree can be established 
according to how far these six characteristics are present and how far the 
three preconditions are absent. This account is broadly in line with other 
accounts of autonomy in the philosophical and related literatures, such as 
those listed above. For example, Sen (2002) defines agency as the ability of 
persons to act on behalf of goals that matter to them (see Robeyns 2003). 
 
However, THN goes on to recognize a higher-order level of autonomy, 
labelled critical autonomy. “Critical autonomy entails the capacity to 
compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one’s own culture, to 
work with others to change them and, in extremis, to move to another 
culture” (THN, p. 187). Compared with autonomy of agency, critical 
autonomy entails some questioning of normally taken-for-granted rules, 
habits and practices – a person’s habitus, in Bourdieu’s terms (1977). This 
draws on Dworkin, who distinguishes between autonomy as “a second-
order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order 
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth” and “the capacity to accept or 
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values” 
(Dworkin, 1988, p. 20).6  
 
Such concepts of autonomy have been described as encapsulating a 
dominant Western conception of ‘the person’ (Geertz, 1984), as a product of 
Western individualism (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), and as inscribing a 
Western normative conception of the good (Christopher, 1999). According 
to some scholars these biases limit the applicability of the notion of 
autonomy to other cultures. This is especially so in South Asia where 
hierarchical and collectivist values appear to be stronger, and where 
‘adherence to controlling pressures’ is associated with greater satisfaction 
 
6
 THN’s distinction between autonomy of agency, which is often ‘critical’, and critical 
autonomy proper, which requires political freedom, now seems too static. Empowerment 
often comes through struggle and the process of struggle in unfree societies can expand 
critical autonomy in major ways. Indeed, apathy in formally free societies can constrict it. In 
practice critical autonomy as defined above can occur in unfree societies. 
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and adaptive outcomes than the ‘absence of all exogenous influences’ 
(Miller, 1997 in Chirkov et al., 2003). This line of reasoning has been 
pursued in discussions of Bangladesh. For example, Wilce (1998) argues 
that autonomy is not an ideal goal that people value and strive after. Instead 
people are far more aware of and concerned about the effectiveness of their 
interpersonal, intergenerational, and inter-group relations because these 
represent the crucial locus of power and identity and pervade the entire 
gamut of life activities. Crucially for the argument presented here many of 
these relations are underpinned by values of deference and hierarchy, and 
often foster subservient behaviour. This raises the important but as yet 
unexplored question about the extent to which levels of constraint or 
coercion in particular cultural contexts (and this does not only apply to so-
called collectivist cultures) impinge on the way people endorse or enact the 
need for autonomy (Madhok 2005). In her analysis of gender relations in 
Bangladesh (undoubtedly a specific context where the level of constraint is 
marked), White (1992) proposes that the notion of ‘centrality’ may be a more 
appropriate idiom than autonomy to understand the way people conceive of 
and strategize around their needs. Unlike autonomy, the notion of centrality 
gives analytical priority to people’s inter-relational milieu, and assumes that 
people - and indeed life - are fundamentally defined in relationships. From 
this perspective, autonomy can even be seen to characterize a bereft 
condition in which the opportunity for meaningful participation in life is 
thwarted (Devine, 2004).  
 
The argument that we should privilege more the inter-relational and 
interdependent milieu in contexts like South Asia recalls an older debate 
highlighted in Dumont’s notion of homo hierarchicus, in which the self is 
regarded as part of a fixed hierarchical order and not as an impermeable 
person with individual needs. The oft-quoted statement of Dumont puts the 
case succinctly:  
To say that the world of caste is a world of relations is to say 
that the particular caste and the particular man have no 
substance: they exist empirically, but they have no reality in 
thought, no being…at the risk of being crude…on the level of 
life in the world the individual is not (Dumont, 1970, p. 272, 
emphasis in original)  
 
Dumont’s assertion is also a classic central reference point for a wider 
debate about what of human nature and experience is universal and what is 
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culturally specific.7 In examining the expression of self in other cultures, 
some scholars have raised concerns about the notion of the individual 
understood as an autonomous and bounded self (Ewing, 1990; Geertz, 
1984; Marriot, 1976) and explained “in terms of either shared biological or 
psychological processes of the organism” (Murray, 1993, p. 6, emphasis in 
original). This conception of self is strongly associated with Western 
philosophical and theological traditions that prioritize an essentialised and 
individualist notion of person (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). In the 
alternative Dumontian perspective, individuals are subsumed in the social 
whole - hierarchically embedded as opposed to autonomous actors, socio-
centred beings as opposed to ego-centred ones (Shweder and Bourne, 
1984). The basis for behaviour, action, and aspiration therefore arises from 
the position one holds in the social order, which not surprisingly is 
manipulated to ultimately serve the interests of super-ordinates. While there 
is much to criticize in ideas associated with homo hierarchicus, there is no 
denying that in contexts like Bangladesh ‘knowing one’s position in the 
social order’ is foundational to being and doing. Self therefore is socially 
constructed and “can be conceived of as an unequally distributed privilege 
rather than as a biological given” (Wilce, 1998, p. 40).  
 
Thus at some level, we seem to be confronted with an irreconcilable 
opposition between Western notions of and moral claims for autonomy as a 
universal human need, and non-Western ideas and endorsements of 
interdependence or even dependence. In the next section we address these 
ideas further and explore in some detail the possibility of a synthesis.  
 
Reconciling Human Autonomy and Interdependence 
 
Immanuel Kant, who first coined the word autonomy, also coined its 
opposite ‘heteronomy’ (derived from the Greek ‘another’ + ‘rule’) (Kant, 
1948 [1785]). This referred to situations where moral imperatives either 
come from without (in the form of a deity, the state, or other people) or from 
contingent drives or personal delusions (Honderich, 2005; Lindley, 1986). 
The re-introduction of the notion of heteronomy offers an important 
 
7 
Dumont’s assertion that the ‘individual’ self does not exist is germane to our discussion 
because of the proposition that autonomy is a universal human need (Doyal and Gough 
1991).  
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corrective that helps structure our subsequent discussion. While it is true 
that some interpretations of autonomy do seem to equate autonomy with 
radical independence and self-sufficiency,8 for most writers such an 
interpretation of autonomy cannot be sustained. It is therefore erroneous to 
equate autonomy with radical independence or individualism.  
 
The argument that autonomy implies a degree of dependence on other 
actors and external environments is made clearly in THN. To quote it at 
length:  
The individualist interpretation divorces the actor from the social 
environment within which their personal identity evolves. All 
individuals discover who they are through learning what they can 
and cannot do. Individual action is social to the extent that it must 
be learned from and reinforced by others. Actors are socialised 
into following rules - expressions of collectively held and enforced 
aims and beliefs. These range from the obviously public (e.g., how 
to exchange one set of goods for another) to those which seem 
essentially private (e.g., bathing, toilet etiquette). Such rules 
constitute the parameters of our sense of self and of others - our 
individual vision of what (formally) is and is not privately and 
publicly possible. Thus the autonomy necessary for successful 
action is not compromised by the necessity to follow rules – quite 
the opposite. It is precisely the normative constraints of our social 
environment which make the specific choice to do x rather than y a 
real possibility (THN, p. 77). 
 
However, the argument that autonomy is constituted relationally and 
contextually is not an endorsement of the kind of cultural determinism 
suggested in Geertz’s contention that “the shapes of knowledge are always 
ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments and their encasements” 
(Geertz, 1984, p. 4). Rather it endorses a structuration approach, which 
highlights the essentially recursive character of social life (Archer, 1988; 
Giddens, 1984). In other words, without individual capacity for action there 
can be no social structure, and without social structure there can be no 
individual capacity for action. It is for this reason that individual autonomy 
 
8
 Wolff, for example, appears to associate autonomy with independence: “the autonomous 
man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another” (Wolff 1970: 14).   
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must always be achieved in an institutional context, and this assumes 
interdependence. Any concept of autonomy, which does not begin from this 
ontological fact, is worthless.  
 
Chirkov et al. (2003) offered another perspective that is relevant to this 
discussion in their examination of the relative autonomy of cultural practices 
in South Korea, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. Working within the 
framework of Self Determination Theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000), they 
oppose autonomy and heteronomy, as well as independence and 
dependence, arguing that these two dimensions are orthogonal. Autonomy 
is defined in a more experiential way, as “when [a person’s] behaviour is 
experienced as willingly enacted and when he or she fully endorses the 
actions ... and/or the values expressed by them” (Chirkov et al., 2003, p. 98, 
after Deci and Ryan, 1985). This allows them to bring autonomy and 
dependence together in a synergistic manner. Thus, they argue that in 
certain circumstances “one can be autonomously dependent on another, 
willingly rely on his or her care, particularly if the other is perceived as 
supportive and responsive” (Chirkov et al., p. 98). They distinguish various 
motives for action, which lie along a continuum of relative autonomy, using 
four major categories that are drawn from Deci and Ryan: 
· External regulation, where a person acts only to obtain external 
rewards or to escape punishment 
· Introjected regulation, where a person acts to experience approval 
by self or others, or to avoid feelings of guilt or self-disparagement 
· Identified regulation, where a person consciously endorses a given 
behaviour or value as having personal significance and importance 
· Integrated regulation, where the behaviour or value is integrated into 
everyday life and coordinated with one’s other identifications. 
 
The distinctions implied in these categories are useful for our discussion 
because they implicitly acknowledge that in specific circumstances different 
people will exercise different degrees of autonomy. In turn this reinforces 
the need for more empirical investigation. Thus, in the Chirkov et al. study, 
undertaken on university students in four different countries (Korea, Russia, 
Turkey, and the US), participants were asked to register their agreement or 
disagreement with a variety of statements. The study found that participants 
rated their countries differently as predicted along individualistic-collectivistic 
and horizontal-vertical dimensions. However, they also varied considerably 
in the degree to which they internalised these ambient orientations. Thus 
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people articulated a desire for authenticity within so-called collectivist 
cultures (suggesting the possibility of autonomy), and heteronomous desires 
within individualist cultures.9      
 
The Self Determination Theory framework therefore offers important insights 
that are relevant to our argument here. First, it explicitly differentiates 
independence and individualism from autonomy. Second, it acknowledges 
the possibility that people can be autonomously interdependent (as the first 
point implies). In the context of South Asia, we can find much evidence that 
the synthesis of autonomy and interdependence is possible. In one review, 
Appadurai (1986) examines the contribution of three different authors who 
demonstrate in different ways how people - often through struggle and 
collective action – create a more positive conception of self for themselves. 
This conception then becomes a stronger basis upon which to exercise 
autonomous action. Thus one of the books reviewed (Khare, 1984), 
explores the way Untouchable communities in Lucknow use their social 
dependence to construct a coherent voice that facilitates autonomous 
action. In contrast to the Dumontian homo hierarchicus that privileges an 
underlying and foundational ideology of hierarchy, unity, and karma, the 
Untouchables of Lucknow construct and build upon an ideology that Khare 
identifies as ‘equalitarian’ and ‘individualistic’. Admittedly the conception of 
the individual used here is different from that assumed in Western 
traditions,10 but it enables the Untouchables to establish and achieve 
defined goals in a more autonomous way. In this process, they effectively 
convert their social dependence into a radical political resource that not only 
becomes an ideological critique of their present situation, but also allows the 
 
9
 Chirkov et al’s findings (2003), however, may relate more to the problematic nature of the 
binary distinction between individualism and collectivism. For further details see Oyserman et 
al (2002) and Matsumoto (1999).  
10
 To summarize Khare’s argument, his conception of an individual has a more spiritual or 
transcendental sens e. At this level, all individuals are equal. This sense of individual 
contrasts with the figure of the ‘caste person’ that is pivotal to the ruthless hierarchical world 
depicted by Dumont and others. The transcendental self becomes a cultural ideological 
construct that offers the Untouchables strategic opportunities for social redress in their 
everyday lives.  
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communities of Lucknow to participate more fully in their respective social 
contexts.11   
 
Thus we have good evidence that despite the prevalence of hierarchically 
structured relationships that determine the basis for all human action, 
people do achieve goals at interpersonal (del Franco, 2005), inter-familial 
(White, 1992) and inter-group (Devine, 2006) levels. By recognizing the co-
existence of autonomy and interdependence, we implicitly accept therefore 
that there will be differences in the extent to which people can exercise 
autonomy. This is anticipated in the philosophical literature and elsewhere. 
For example, Raz (1986) introduced a notion of significant autonomy, 
understood as the ability of people to shape their lives and determine their 
course, and argues that the ability of people to acquire it ‘is a matter of 
degree’ (Raz, 1986, p. 154). Also and as discussed above, the framework 
offered by Self Determination Theory presents a continuum of relative 
autonomy that ranges from external regulation to integrated regulation. In a 
recent study of Brazilian and Canadian students, Chirkov et al. (2005) apply 
this thinking further and find that even where hierarchical or vertical cultural 
arrangements dominate, there is evidence that people still exercise relative 
autonomy. Appadurai uses his review to argue that the value attached in the 
Indian context to hierarchy, interrelationship and dependence does not 
preclude the possibility that people can articulate goals and have the 
autonomy to act upon these. This is a position that resonates well with 
research carried out in Bangladesh. It is thus possible and indeed crucial to 
assess the degree of autonomy possessed by individuals – at least in 
theory. We now turn to whether it is possible in practice.  
 
Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
Two questions need addressing to provide evidence on the co-
existence of personal autonomy and substantial social dependence in 
modern-day Bangladesh: 
1. to what extent do Bangladeshis value autonomy? 
2. how is this expressed within relations of dependence? 
 
11
 Khare’s observation of increased social participation among untouchables is important 
since Dumont claimed that real autonomy was possible only for those who figuratively ‘leave’ 
or do not fully participate in society such as holy men, drop-outs, and so forth. 
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To what extent do Bangladeshis value autonomy? Although respondents 
never explicitly used the word autonomy, they expressed an appreciation of 
the idea of autonomy in other terms. Thus in the urban data set (women 
aged 20-65), women talked about the importance of having individual 
independence (“to be able to go where I want, to be free”, “fulfill [my] own 
hopes in life”). Independence was facilitated by (1) remaining physically fit, 
(2) continuing to work outside the home, and (3) having self-sufficiency at 
the household level (having your ‘own’ house, “not going to others to borrow 
something”). Similarly many women emphasised a desire to be educated, 
have a job, receive recognition from their family and community, be able to 
help others, live according to their principles, and have their own income 
and/or assets. What unites all these statements is a strong sense of women 
seeking to have greater control over their lives.  
 
A very similar pattern is discernible in the data from rural and peri-urban 
sites (men and women aged 19 and over). Here we find significant 
commonality with all groups stressing the importance of key autonomy 
characteristics, albeit with different degrees of emphasis (see Table 1). For 
example, potential indicators of autonomy are being able to work and 
provide for your family’s needs, leading or managing your household, being 
able to bring your children up well, being able to support your parents in 
their old age, having some degree of financial independence and/ or 
mobility, and not being dependent on others. For some groups these could 
be expanded to include participation in social assistance or community 
development, social status within the community, and involvement in 
household decision-making.  
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Table 1: Autonomy Characteristics Identified From the Data From the 
First Phase of the QoL Research in Rural Bangladesh 
Older men Younger men Older women Young women 
Can provide for 
own and  family’s 
needs 
Can provide for 
own and  family’s 
needs 
 Can provide for 
family and  
children’s daily 
needs 
Able to work Able to work; can 
concentrate on 
work 
Able to work Can work 
independently 
Not dependent on 
others (physically 
or economically) 
 Not dependent on 
children (physically 
or economically) 
Self sufficient within 
the home (e.g., own 
latrine) (household 
not dependent on 
others) 
Acknowledged 
and  effective 
leader of 
household (e.g., 
able to maintain 
joint household 
after sons’ 
marriages) 
Manages 
household well 
 
Able to manage 
home (e.g., can 
concentrate on 
many tasks at 
once) 
Children listen to 
her 
Knows how to 
perform household 
chores and manage 
home 
Consulted by 
husband; doesn’t 
live in joint 
household so 
autonomous 
decision making 
and/ or 
participates in 
household 
decision making 
 
Able to bequeath 
property to 
children 
   
Brought children 
up well – now 
good, respected 
members of 
community 
Brought children 
up well – now 
good, respected 
members of 
community (not 
source of shame) 
and  prepared to 
provide for 
parents in return  
Brought children 
up well – now 
good, respected 
members of 
community (not 
source of shame) 
and prepared to 
provide for her in 
return  
Brought children up 
well – now good, 
respected members 
of community (not 
source of shame) 
and prepared to 
provide for 
parents in return  
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Older men Younger men Older women Young women 
Respected by 
community (e.g., 
frequently 
consulted, 
participates in 
community 
development) 
Respected by 
community  
 
  
Good social 
networks (e.g., 
with extended 
family) 
   
 Pleases parents 
 
Husband alive and 
acting as 
‘autonomy 
support’; takes 
care of husband 
 
Maintains good 
relationship with 
children 
 
 Financially 
independent; able 
to travel 
Earns a good 
income 
 
Own income/ 
savings, which 
enable her to meet 
her needs 
Able to come and 
go as she wishes 
Can make 
purchases of her 
choice; can buy 
things for children 
and support natal 
home from own 
income  
 Educated  Can tutor children 
and/ or be 
involved in their 
education 
Bold indicates specific to this category of respondent 
 
For older men it was also important to be able to leave an inheritance to 
their children, be respected by their community, and participate in 
community development. Being respected by their community was 
important to younger men, who also wanted to please their parents, and be 
able to study and travel. Younger women similarly wanted “to come and go 
as she pleases”, and also to work independently and be able to purchase 
things for their children and their parents (whether they had their own 
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source of income or not). In terms of interpersonal autonomy, they wanted 
to be consulted by their husband, participate in household decision-making, 
be involved in their children’s education, and have a good relationship with 
their children. In contrast, older women only wanted to be listened to by their 
children and take care of their husband (they were also the only group who 
didn’t mention providing for their family’s needs, presumably because this 
isn’t a realistic expectation).  
 
Autonomy within dependence. A clear gender difference was evident: 
women’s autonomy needs were more focused on other people and the 
quality of their relationships with them. For example, older women wanted to 
be physically fit so they wouldn’t be a burden on their children, and younger 
women wanted independent incomes so they could contribute to the 
household. Women’s experiences of autonomy were also centred on the 
home, rather than say the market or community. This meant that even when 
the scope of their autonomy extended beyond the home (for example, 
through reciprocal links with their natal family), the actual engagements still 
took place in a domestic setting.  
 
In contrast, men’s autonomy needs appeared to be more focussed on 
themselves, and stressed much more the importance of developing 
personal competence, self-efficacy, self-mastery, and so on. Thus more 
than any other group young men emphasised their own education, even 
above that of their children. They also expressed a desire to be 
acknowledged leaders of their households, which implies some form of 
social recognition that they have amassed particular qualities and skills.  
 
Interestingly, in the peri-urban/ rural data set young women only talked 
about education in terms of being able to educate their children better, 
although it was clearly intrinsically important to young urban women. This 
apparent difference in the value accorded to education may be artefactual, 
but it may also represent a more fundamental gender difference of seeing, 
or at least talking about autonomy and other practices in terms of their 
instrumental rather than their intrinsic value. For example, young women 
wanting to be educated in order to educate their children, or worshipping 
Allah so that he will take care of their families.  
 
These findings were supported by examples of autonomy experienced 
within relationships (‘centrality’) from the urban dataset. For example, the 
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importance of being consulted by one’s sons and the ‘psychological 
insecurity’ caused by not having children to look after you when you are 
older. The family network appeared to be one of the main arenas in which 
people exercise their autonomy and meet their basic needs, even the ones 
that relate to autonomy (e.g., the importance of having a husband who 
“takes her consent for everything”, i.e., who asks her to endorse every 
decision, Choudhury, 2005). This integration was described by one female 
respondent as the way “families where people are expressing their own 
views stay unified and happy as no one is subject to the power of another”. 
Although this appears rather idealistic, it is important to note that families 
are also the arenas where accommodations to individual needs are most 
commonly resolved. This of course may not be fully evident to ‘the public 
view’ (Ewing, 1991).  
 
Critical autonomy within dependence. Some of our data convey the 
importance of education in encouraging wider reflection and moral 
reasoning (“[less educated people] do not know which is good and which is 
bad”). It may stimulate flexibility in traditional roles (“education makes men 
sympathetic and helpful”) and the development of wisdom. Implicitly it can 
also help prevent uncritical acceptance of the messages transmitted by the 
mass media where “the serials [natoks] show such things like daughter-in-
laws and households living separately which influence young people today.”  
 
The benefits of awareness and consciousness extend to the family, 
although it’s possible that knowledge of how things work in Bangladeshi 
society may support traditional practices rather than challenge them 
(“members of [uneducated] families create conflict among themselves 
because they are not conscious about their role in the family”). This 
knowledge is most beneficial when coupled with an empathic awareness of 
others so that “members of an educated family can understand each other 
and avoid conflicts when they realize the facts of the situation.” However, 
education may be a resource that needs to be managed carefully as “on the 
other hand, an educated person can create all kinds of problems in his 
family; he can understand as well as compromise everything”.  
 
Assessing Domain Specific Autonomy 
 
Implicit in the argument thus far is a recognition that autonomy results from 
the combined effect of internal and external factors. Recently Diener and 
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Biswas-Diener explored in more detail the interplay of both factors in 
determining subjective well-being (2004). In their discussion they introduced 
the notion of empowerment and made a distinction between external and 
internal forms of empowerment.  While external empowerment refers to 
external conditions (income, status, and collective power) that permit or 
inhibit effective action, internal empowerment refers mostly to personal traits 
and characteristics (competences, skills, and abilities). Perhaps not 
surprisingly they make the argument that both external and internal 
empowerment are necessary for effective action, and that outcomes will 
reflect the complex interplay of external circumstances and people’s skills 
and resources.12 Crucially however they suggested that the assessment of 
outcomes can only be made in reference to specific goals or circumstances. 
This is germane to our discussion because it alerts us to the need to look at 
specific contexts or domains separately to assess the scope for and practice 
of autonomous action in each. Again each case will require, as we have 
argued, close consideration of internal and external factors as well as an 
examination of how both factors influence each other.  
 
Whereas THN advocates overall measures of the absence of autonomy, 
notably mental ill-health and poor socially-relevant competences, Alkire 
strongly advocates a disaggregated approach (2002, 2005, 2006), although 
she acknowledges the possibility of ‘spill-over’ effects between the domains 
(2006). In a disaggregated approach, a person’s agency is assessed with 
respect to different functionings or broader domains of life. Thus a woman 
may be empowered as a citizen in the political sphere, but prevented by her 
gender or lack of education from getting a job, or be unable to make crucial 
decisions in the household. The advantage of such an approach is that it 
allows for a stronger appreciation of the embedded nature of autonomous 
action, and offers fascinating insights into how people are both constrained 
by, and able to manipulate their social contexts. In short, it facilitates the 
measurement of situated autonomies. However, the risk of such approaches 
 
12 
Ewing (1991) explores the relationship between external and internal empowerment at the 
individual level in an intriguing analysis of young Pakistani women that rests on a distinction 
between interpersonal and intrapsychic autonomy. She argues that the latter, akin to Diener 
and Biswas -Diener’s internal empowerment, enables them to deal effectively with the 
common stresses encountered in their new in-laws’ homes.  
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is that they become so fixed on a specific set of domains that the 
interconnectedness of domains across people’s lives is lost.13  
 
Rahman and Rao (2002) provided a powerful example of an investigation 
into domain specific autonomy. In their study of women’s agency in north 
and south India, they considered kinship, labour markets, and public action 
to be the three most important domains, and developed indicators of 
autonomy within each. Thus, in the kinship domain they selected two key 
indicators: women’s ability to move freely outside the home and their 
participation in household decision-making. In the labour market domain, 
they focused on options for earning outside the home and control over the 
household budget. Finally in the public action domain they found that the 
presence of public goods such as electricity, schools, and roads strongly 
enhanced women’s autonomy.  
 
Alsop and Heinsohn (2005) undertook a related study of women’s 
empowerment, defined as: enhancing the capacity of individuals or groups 
to make choices and achieve desired actions and outcomes. To do this they 
adopted a rigorous methodology that gave strong insights into domain-
specific autonomous action. In their study they measured different degrees 
of empowerment by assessing: 
1. Whether a person has the opportunity to make a choice. So for 
example if a woman wants to send her daughter to school, is there a 
school for the daughter to go to? 
2. Whether a person actually uses the opportunity to choose. So if the 
answer to (1) is yes, does the woman actually make the decision to 
send her daughter to school? 
3. Whether, once the choice is made, it brings the desired outcome. So 
if the answer to (2) is yes, does the daughter actually attend school? 
 
These aspects of empowerment were then operationalised within three 
domains of people’s lives – the state, the market, and society – and at three 
different levels – macro, intermediary, and local. This yields a rich matrix of 
empowerment options, which may or may not be open to groups of women, 
 
13
 The assumption that people’s lives can be divided into discrete and quantifiable domains 
may be a reinscription of Cartesian dualism, as explored in Camfield and McGregor 2005 
(see also Nilsson et al 2005 in a Bangladeshi context).  
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and allows for an analysis into the interplay of external and internal 
conditions. For example, societal level indicators from Ethiopia are: women 
having an equal say over the spacing of children, or investment in 
household durables. Commenting on this study, Alkire (2006) concluded 
that the research enables us to make a crucial distinction between having 
the capability to do something, and choosing whether or not to do it. 
 
A final study worth mentioning here is offered by Madhok (2005), in which 
she moves the analytical lens away from actions per se to the thought 
processes through which people arrive at decisions to act or not act. This 
comes very close to Doyal and Gough’s idea of ‘critical autonomy’ entailing 
the capacity of self-reflection. Madhok’s work examines the various personal 
attempts of sathins (workers within the Women’s Development Program in 
the State of Rajasthan) to transform the dominant discourse of political 
rights. Her account details the creative ways in which women selectively 
absorb and identify with rights discourses in an attempt to create a new and 
alternative moral framework that increases their participation and influence 
in the political sphere. Although Madhok’s work illustrates the exercise of 
autonomy in a specific domain of life, her invitation to focus more on ideas 
than actions advances our understanding of autonomy, especially in 
adverse environments. In adverse contexts, where freedoms are often 
constrained, the exercise of autonomy may only be expressed cautiously in 
public, if indeed at all. However, and this is crucial, a lack of public 
expression (or action) does not mean that people do not exercise or value 
autonomy.  
 
This raises an important question regarding the whole issue of researching 
autonomy in conditions of subordination. Madhok takes as an example the 
indicator of small family sizes, which is typically used to indicate greater 
women’s autonomy in relation to fertility. She argues that this indicator may 
be inadequate in certain contexts because it fails crucially to tell us whether 
the decision to have a small family actually belongs to the woman, her 
husband, or some other external actor such as an extended family. In other 
words the ‘indicator’ may not be indicating women’s autonomy at all. This 
leads Madhok to propose that in order to make conclusive arguments about 
autonomy it is vital to determine women’s ideal preferences rather than rely 
solely on those expressed in action. By examining ideas and preferences, 
we gain a fuller understanding of choices that are made and also the 
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reasons (social, political, economic and cultural) that determine whether 
choices are then translated into action or not.  
 
At a more general level, we can conclude that there are cultures and 
contexts where the public endorsement or enactment of autonomy may be 
difficult or even impossible. However this does not mean that autonomy is 
less valued and this represents a fundamental challenge to those seeking to 
carry out research into autonomy in contexts like Bangladesh where 
patterns of subordination and deference are more evident in everyday life.14  
 
Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
The majority of rural respondents identified four key domains that they 
considered important in a discussion of autonomy: (1) family (household 
decision-making), (2) employment, (3) finances, and (4) community (ability 
to participate in community development). However older women were less 
ambitious in identifying domains and emphasised much more the 
importance of achieving autonomy in their finances (by having a small 
income or some savings). Additionally, older men and women were 
concerned with physical autonomy, while younger ones wanted access to 
education and mobility. 
 
Female respondents from the urban data set are also exercising autonomy, 
or trying to exercise it, in the domains of (1) family, and (2) employment, but 
they added a third domain of education. For example, they cited control over 
the timing of their marriage and choice of partner, and having control over a 
sum of money that they could use to fulfil their family’s needs. Younger (but 
not older) women wanted to be consulted by their husbands and for their 
household to be physically autonomous.  
 
One issue for younger women was having control over a sum of money that 
they could use within the context of their relationships, for example, to fulfil 
the needs of their children, or provide support to their natal home. This did 
not need to be a large amount, or even entirely their own, as the expressed 
goal was not financial independence or having a good income, as was the 
 
14
 We are indebted to one of the reviewers for drawing our attention to the wider research 
implications of Madhok’s study.  
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case for young men.  Their sense of achievement was derived instead from 
sources like advising and assisting others, and maintaining their principles 
(“I have led my life according to Islam. This gives me peace in my mind”). 
This illustrates the operation of autonomous values within dependent 
relationships. 
 
Education was a key personal resource for younger women and was 
described as a “wealth”, which “no one can take away” (not having 
education was like “having eyes and being blind”). It was seen as 
strengthening their capabilities (“they can perform their tasks well so they 
are an asset for their family”), developing “a cool mind to tackle problems”, 
and giving them access to “office” jobs, income, and respect (“a girl who is 
educated is regarded differently”). It also provided “social acceptance as an 
unmarried woman” (removing the pressure to marry young), and a stronger 
position with their in-laws when they did marry (“if she were a graduate she 
would not have to ask her husband for everything”). These dimensions of 
education were confirmed by a recent study in rural Bangladesh (Nargish, 
2004), which examined how it functioned to increase access to higher 
paying jobs, and improve marriage prospects, friendship, social status, and 
other valued outcomes. 
  
Collective Action and Autonomy 
 
Finally we want to consider the link between collective action and autonomy. 
This is particularly pertinent to the context of Bangladesh where there is a 
proliferation of community based organizations and non-governmental 
organizations working with the poor. Interestingly, the most positive 
presentation of ideas synonymous with autonomy is by development 
organizations. ‘Independence’ and ‘self reliance’ therefore are projected 
much more as goals of organizations than they are of individuals (Wilce, 
1998).  
 
Early development analyses in Bangladesh highlighted a key link between 
what was perceived as traditional patterns of relationships, based 
essentially on deference and subordination, and the reproduction of poverty. 
Typically but not exclusively, these relationships took the form of patron-
client networks – a system of organization where vertical relations across 
class lines are forged between poorer clients and richer patrons. The 
relationship between patron and client has been described as a moral or 
  24 
 
benevolent one (Devine, 1999; Maloney, 1988; McGregor, 1994) because it 
triggers a series of expectations and obligations that determine the chances 
of entitlement demands ever being satisfied. For the poor, both survival and 
upward mobility depend on the ability to secure the sympathy of a reliable 
patron. This however was never guaranteed, and in most cases clients were 
obliged to demonstrate personal loyalty and allegiance. Subordination and 
coercion were therefore written into the very fabric of patron-client relations, 
an inevitable outcome of what Wood (2003) has aptly termed the Faustian 
Bargain.  
 
As a consequence of this analysis, the majority of early Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) adopted radical agendas that explicitly set out to free 
the poor from their subordinate client status. Building on insights from Paolo 
Freire’s pedagogy of liberation (Freire, 1972), these organizations adopted 
the language of conscientisation, self-reliance, and solidarity to highlight 
their intention. They explicitly presented themselves as an alternative social 
force that could help the poor redress power imbalances and take more 
control over their lives. This process ultimately implied breaking free of 
dominating relationships and a reaffirmation of autonomy.  
 
In her analysis of the dynamics of development-orientated organizations, 
Alkire (2002, 2005) argues that the level and quality of participation are key 
determinants of whether or not outcomes will be beneficial for participants. 
She identifies four aspects of participation that need to be considered (2002, 
p. 129-143):  
· Intrinsic value, i.e., is participation deemed personally valuable by 
the participant (something which facilitates agency achievement)  
· Transitive effects, i.e., does participation improve outcomes 
· Constructive effects, i.e., does participation help shape values and 
priorities 
· Intransitive effects, i.e., does participation fashion group identity. 
 
These considerations are a useful reminder that not everything that falls 
under the umbrella of participation works to the benefit of participants 
(White, 2000). To link the discussion of participation with our earlier 
exploration of autonomy, we can argue that participation in collective action 
forms may encourage behaviour that is more heteronomous (e.g. coercive 
or subordinating) or more autonomous. The difference between these 
positions requires detailed empirical investigation. Our view is that to be 
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autonomous, the type of agency to evolve from participation in organizations 
like NGOs must be self-conscious and not simply a reflection of compliance 
with inherited institutions, or habitus. In other words, it should entail some 
sense of critical autonomy. Also, such collective autonomy will typically seek 
to influence the institutions that affect people’s lives. This too can be 
assessed within distinct domains and at different levels.15 
 
Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
In this instance, our evidence from Bangladesh relates to the experience of 
a particular development organization called Shammo,16 which one of us 
has observed over a number of years. Members of the organization are 
poor landless farmers who for many years have lived and worked under the 
authority of local elite landlords in a patron-client relationship. As poorer 
clients, they were expected to offer loyalty to their respective patrons in the 
hope of receiving benefits or favours that would help them achieve a more 
secure livelihood. The balance of power in the relationship is so biased 
towards the patron that the ability of poorer clients to act collectively in their 
own interests is severely constrained. Thus in the area where Shammo was 
working, the political power of the local elites was so strong that they were 
able to forcibly take control over huge amounts of agricultural land that the 
Government had allocated by decree to the landless farmers.17 Given that 
the poor relied on the same patrons for their subsistence, there was very 
little reaction to the elites’ strategy. However when Shammo began as an 
organization,  the land that had been illegally taken from the poor became 
an obvious focus point for mobilization.  
 
 
15
 There are big issues about the relationship between collective autonomy and individual 
autonomy, which cannot be discussed here. However, we would claim that the weight of 
scientific findings and historical experience suggests that the success of challenges to 
oppressive social orders is proportionate to the critical autonomy of the challengers. See for 
example Barrington Moore’s impressive study of injustice, based on class struggles in 
nineteenth century Germany (Barrington Moore 1978, especially chapter 3).  
16 ‘
Shammo’ is a pseudonym for this development organization. For more details see Devine 
(1999). 
17 
Agricultural land allocated to the poor in this way is known as khas land. In the area where 
Shammo was working there was an area of over 800 acres of khas land that had been taken 
over by the elites.   
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Beginning from a palpable sense of injustice and grievance, Shammo 
evolved gradually into a site where its members were able to nurture new 
forms of agency for themselves that often, but not always, translated into 
action. Three key elements facilitated the creation of this new form of 
agency for Shammo’s members (Devine, 2004). First, the organization 
facilitated the construction of a new form of shared identity that enabled 
members to shift their allegiance away from the domination of traditional 
elites and to act more as a collective unit. This is close to Alkire’s notion of 
intransitive effects. For Shammo’s members the new form of shared identity 
was nurtured in a number of ways ranging from routine meetings and 
general daily interaction to more public events such as processions and 
rallies. Second, the organization ensured the delivery of tangible 
improvements to its members (what Alkire refers to as transitive effects), for 
example, recovering ownership of the land that was theirs by right. However 
with time the organization and its members also acquired positional 
advantage vis-à-vis political and bureaucratic structures charged with 
delivering key services and goods. As a result of this, members successfully 
managed to lobby for better and just wages, improved working conditions 
for sharecroppers, and a more transparent distribution of government 
welfare goods and services. Finally, the organization also fostered utopian 
spaces (de Certeau, 1984) in which the future aspirations of members and 
the potential for further reconfigurations of power relations are nurtured 
(Appadurai, 2004). This is the area of life where people formulate their ideal 
preferences and judgments, and then decide if and how to enact these 
(Madhok, 2005) – Alkire’s constructive effects.   
 
There is therefore a prima facie case for confirming that organizations like 
Shammo can facilitate new forms of agency. However, it is important to look 
beyond the outcomes and ask about the quality of agency that is nurtured. 
While Shammo has been pivotal to the task of establishing, protecting and 
then advancing the rights of its poor members, Devine (2002) provides 
evidence that this has been underpinned by a logic of preferential 
behaviour. For example, the entitlement rights of certain people (e.g. to 
land) were privileged while those of others were ignored. Thus, entitlement 
claims were more likely to receive a positive response if the claimant was a 
member of Shammo (as opposed to a non-member), and then if the 
claimant was known to be publicly loyal to the organization’s leaders. In 
other words, people who were closest to the leaders seemed to enjoy 
stronger entitlement claims. This leads us therefore to a rather nebulous 
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area where the boundaries between favours and rights are blurred. The 
result of this is that among members as well as between members and staff 
of the organization, new forms of clientelist behaviour emerged as 
individuals tried to get closer to and publicly demonstrate their loyalty to the 
organization’s leaders. Fully aware of this, members continued to trust the 
organization because they ultimately judged it as caring, supportive, and 
relevant to their everyday struggles. In other words, the organization helped 
people move from a more heteronomous condition (under the old patrons) 
to a more autonomous one. Using this as an illustration, Devine makes the 
more general argument that in contexts like Bangladesh, the right kind of 
dependency relationship can be an important and creative vehicle within 
which the poor can effectively exercise greater agency and autonomy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that autonomy is firmly rooted in Western intellectual traditions has 
led some to question its coherence and suitability for understanding well-
being in developing countries. Using qualitative data from people’s 
evaluation of the quality of their lives in Bangladesh, this article has shown 
that the concept of autonomy is a useful one in that it captures people’s 
goals and attempts to change things in a way they consider important for 
their overall well-being. More technically, the concept of autonomy gives 
important insights into the construction and experience of people’s 
capacities as agents. Our data supports three key arguments. First, people 
from rural and urban Bangladesh express what could be characterised as a 
need for autonomy in both explicit and implicit terms. Second, the pursuit of 
autonomy is iterative and cumulative in that people tend to focus on 
particular domains in their lives where they wish to increase their ability to 
exercise agency. Moreover, different people prioritize different domains and 
we can tentatively assume that these choices change over time. Finally, 
experiences of autonomy occur primarily within and through people’s 
interpersonal relationships. While family and kin networks seem to be 
central, in some cases formal organizations such as community-based or 
development organizations can also play a crucial role. 
 
Our choice to use data from Bangladesh was a deliberate one. First, it is 
one of the poorest countries in the world where conditions of subordination 
and adversity are ubiquitous. While people in Bangladesh may experience 
numerous ‘lacks of freedoms’ in their lives, this does not mean, our data 
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suggests, that they are necessarily weak in autonomy. Second, Bangladesh 
is often characterised as a society in which people express their 
personhood in more relational as opposed to individualist forms.18 Our data 
shows that this is not incompatible with the pursuit of autonomy and indeed 
it may be a medium through which autonomy is more effectively achieved. 
Autonomy can be directed toward either social or personal goals or both, 
and can be enacted individually, or by participation in groups, or both.   
 
The analysis reported here ultimately presents a complex array of situated 
autonomies that embrace a wide range of covert as well as overt behaviour 
patterns, decisions, and actions. Rather than locate this as an argument in 
favour of cultural relativism, we would argue that it underlines the recursive 
nature of human life. In other words, autonomy is determined not only by the 
agential capacities of an individual but also by the nature of relationships he 
or she may enjoy with others. Two implications flow from this. First of all, it 
is imperative that we focus more research on how people in specific 
contexts negotiate and organize to achieve more autonomy in their lives. 
The distinction between individualist and collectivist contexts has thrown up 
important insights. But it can be distracting as even in more collectivist 
societies like Bangladesh there are important differences in the way people 
attempt to achieve autonomy and how they evaluate this. Similarly, people 
can achieve high levels of autonomy in particular domains (including the 
cognitive or intrapsychic domain) but may fail to transfer or express these in 
other domains. One can expect to find therefore considerable subtlety, 
ambiguity, and even contradiction, in the strategies people deploy to 
achieve greater autonomy.  
 
This leads directly to the second reflection that is more conceptual in nature. 
To understand the full significance of situated autonomies, we would argue 
that it is important to introduce a stronger theory of power to our analysis. 
Actions, preferences and values are never created ex nihilo (Lukes, 1974) 
and therefore it is incumbent to reflect on the formation of values, and the 
processes by which people decide to express preferred choices in action or 
 
18
 The way personhood is expressed in Bangladesh is obviously dynamic. For example, the 
urbanization of rural life, the gradual nuclearization of household structures, and increased 
education are but three processes that may in time have an immediate impact on the way 
people see themselves. 
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inaction. This, we would contend, will take us towards a richer appreciation 
of the social and cultural construction of autonomy.  
 
But none of this disputes the centrality of autonomy to a eudaimonic 
conception of well-being. Its widespread presence in normative theories of 
the good life, theories of common human needs and eudaimonic 
approaches in psychology has received empirical support in our initial 
qualitative research in Bangladesh. That it has resonance in such a 
materially impoverished yet relationally dense milieu adds support to its 
universality. It illustrates that there are aspects of well-being beyond 
hedonic satisfaction, and that our understanding of eudaimonic well-being is 
enhanced by using an appropriate and situated notion of autonomy. 
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